Demise of Yojana Bhawan

Jawaharlal Nehru chairing a meeting of the Planning Commission

Like other relics of the Nehruvian era  - smoke-belching Ambassador cars, huge unwieldy Murphy radio sets, urban sprawls of ugly, box-like, post-World War flats, the fashion statement of the Nehru jacket and Godrej typewriters – the Planning Commission, housed just three buildings away from the Indian Parliament, is now destined for history’s dustbin. 
The body, housed in the appropriately named Yojana Bhawan (Planning House), was a warren of offices where in its heydays, economists and Babus decided how many bicycles could be made in a factory, what should be the price of a bar of steel and whether a planed factory should see the light of the day or not.
The concept of economic planning was borrowed from the Soviets, who in the eyes of Third World leaders seemed to have done a wonderful job of pulling their poor, backward Russia into the 20th century. Interestingly, the concept planning and a body which would plan for India was first floated in 1938, by Subhash Bose, as newly elected Congress President. He decided, his rival within the Congress, Jawaharal Nehru was the right man to be dumped with the task of dreaming up plans for India’s  economic greatness.
Nehru, himself a Fabian Socialist,  was nevertheless attracted by the Soviet model of centralised planning and a command economy. In 1950, he issued an executive fiat based on a cabinet resolution setting up the powerful plan panel, something which was said to have upset his finance minister John Mathai to resign, and eventually forced him to resign.  Old timers say, what galled Mathai’s was that the body, which did not even have any constitutional authority, was to take away his powers to decide how much money he could spend for India’s development.
The first man to head it was Gulzari Lal Nanda, a simple, honest Congressman who later went on to be twice acting Prime Minister, before breathing his last in a tiny flat atop a shop in Delhi’s  Khan market.
However, the real spirit behind the planning commission was the statistician P.C.Mahalanobis, a personal friend of Nehru, who came up with an input-output matrix for planning or a spread-sheet method on how much capital to invest to get a required targeted rate of growth for any given industry. Nehru and Mahalanobis’s plan model became something of a rage for development economists across the world, with many making the pilgrimage to Delhi to study the new methodology.

P.C Mahalanobis with Nehru

The Second five year plan, which he authored was a remarkable success with the economy growing at 4.5 per cent. However, before and after that growth floundered, with India’s GDP growth prior to 1991, averaging a poor 3.5 per cent and in some years dipping below 1 per cent!
However, with each passing year and the deepening of India’s License Raj,  Yojana Bhawan came to be seen as politically and financially all-powerful. Though the prime minister was nominally chairman of the Planning Commission, the real master of the house, was the full time deputy chairman. He had the "discretion" to distribute "plan funds" to state governments.  To decide which industry could get how much bank financing, how much machinery they could import, how many shifts they could run and even which industries were at all necessary for India.
At its best, however, economists point out, that it was responsible for much of what Nehru described as temples of modern India – Bhakra Nangal multi-pupose dam project, Durgapur Bhilai, Bokaro and Rourkella steel plants. However, critics also point out how the same commission also recommended setting up stainless teel plant at Salem in Tamil Nadu, under the influence of Mohan Kumarmangalam, without any coal or iron ore available anywhere within 1,000 kms of the plant. Steel made at Durgapur and Roukella was sent by train to be melted down again to be rolled into stainless steel, a remarkable planned exercise in duplicating effort and costs.
The Deputy Chairman of the Commission was more often than not a political stalwart – thir ranks included the likes of V T Krishnamachari, C Subramaniam, P N Haksar, Rama Krishna Hegde, P.V. Naramsimha Rao, Pranab Mukherjee, , Madhu Dandavate, K C Pant and Jaswant Singh, who could skilfully deal with chief ministers and top industrialists alike.
However, not everyone accepted the diktats of the plan panel happily. Two years back, ," Tamil Nadu Chief Minister J Jayalalithaa, sarcarstically told journalists, "We have come to Delhi just to be told by the Commission how we should spend our own money.”
Critics also pointed to the waste and lack of monitoring by the planning body. Bridges which were to have built by the Third Five year plan, were found to have remained unbuilt even after the lapse of 8 more 5-year plans!  Panel members gave themselves a Rs 35 lakh toilet and the panel’s deputy chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia spent a daily average of Rs 2.02 lakh during a six month period in 2011 on foreign tours, even as the Commission recommended that people could live on Rs 28 a day!

 

Vijay Divas – the Day We Miss out in our Celebrations’ List

by Jayanta Roy Chowdhury

The Pakistani Surrender at Dhaka, December 16, 1971

 

Forty one years ago on December 16, independent India won its finest victory, in a war which was not merely a necessity, but perhaps one of the few in the annals of modern history which could be described as righteous.

The victory was not merely won by military muscle but by a combination of outstanding diplomatic, intelligence and industrial effort. India managed to gain the moral high ground even before entering the battlefield through a sustained global public relations campaign which exposed Pakistan’s ghastly record of murdering 2 million Bangladeshi civilians, raping over a quarter million women and driving out a seventh of its population to Indian refugee camps.

Our intelligence agencies had managed to gather vital intelligence on Pakistan’s war intentions, while fooling the rival army into believing we would not carry through the war effort to liberate the whole of East Pakistan.

The Indian military-industrial machinery had managed to manufacture and supply all necessary munitions and war materials despite a ban on arms sales by Western powers, imposed after the 1965 war with Pakistan.

The creation of a new nation Bangladesh, made the world sit up and look at India in a new light. Not only had India liberated a country, the size of Syria in fortnight’s time and taken some 92,000 Pakistani soldiers prisoners of war in the process, it had defied the most powerful nation in the world – the United States of America – through this war. As everyone knows, the United States famously sent its Seventh Fleet to threaten India’s intervention in East Pakistan, and asked allies Jordan and Turkey to send military aircraft to Pakistan’s aid.

Other western powers too were not exactly happy with the turn of events nor was Pakistan’s all weather friend – China – all of whom saw the emergence of Bangladesh under a new secular leadership as a challenge to their control of Asia. Not much reported, was the movement of a British naval group led by the aircraft carrier Eagle closer to India’s territorial waters in what could have been pincer movement in conjunction with the US Seventh Fleet and exhortations by US President Nixon and his secretary of state Henry Kissinger to the Chinese leadership to `threaten’ India on its northern borders.

Kissinger with Mao

By any account, this was a victory,which could be said to equal that of the Pandavas over Kauravas in the Mahabharatan era, of the Grecian wars against Persia or in more modern times of Rommel against the British in Libya.

Yet, strangely, India does not celebrate this victory outside its military cantonments, nor celebrate the men and women associated with this victory by building statues to them or through street naming ceremonies.

If India had been England or the US or even Australia, we would have been holding public commemorative services for those who died, victory parades with participation of defence forces, students and firemen, with floats and dancers on December 16. Statues of Field Marshall Sam Maneckshaw and Air Chief Marshall P.C. Lal would have dotted town squares along with Indira Gandhi’s. School history textbooks would have had whole chapters devoted to this one single decisive war.

But then this is India. Anything militaristic is frowned upon ever since Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s time, perhaps out of a sense of paranoia, fuelled by coups across Asia by Pakistani, Egyptian and Burmese Generals.

Gen J.N.Chaudhuri, who besides winning the 1965 war, also built up the Indian Army after a disastrous rout in 1962 from a 2.5 lakh-strong demoralised army to a three-fold larger and yet more professional national force, was sidelined without much ado by Mrs Indira Gandhi. Documents leaked now, reveal that his phone was probably tapped and that defence minister Y.B.Chavan even went to the extent of questioning him on the possibility of the army trying out a coup-de-etat!

Pt Jawaharlal Nehru with Gen Chaudhuri after 1962 war

Part of the downplaying of 1971 victory is this fear in the minds of India’s political elite that deifying the victory and the victors could result in the rise of a new military culture in this country, which has been an oasis of democracy amidst a continent where military coups have been more the rule than the aberration.

Compounding this fear, was a lack of appreciation on the part of independent India’s leaders of the positive role a modern military can play as an instrument of state policy and in actual policy formulation, especially foreign policy.

Possibly the only two leaders who understood the potential of the military as an instrument of state policy in the 20^th century were Subhash Chandra Bose and Indira Gandhi. Bose, as head of the Azad Hind government during the Second World War, of course, discussed politics and political solutions with the military leaders of the Indian National Army and even went to the extent of consulting them on such issues as whether to declare war on the US and other allied nations or to limit his war to combating Great Britain. Mrs Gandhi is well known to have taken the military leadership into confidence well ahead of the 1971 war and in ensuring a holistic approach to the war effort.
Nehru, on the other hand kept the army at bay by appointing his close aide Krishna Menon, an over-rated intellectual as defence minister and a buffer between himself and the army he rated so lowly.

Menon and Nehru had such a low esteem of the Indian military leadership’s abilities as advisors for their foreign policy, that they never bothered to take their inputs on India’s options in the border spat with China in the early years of the dispute. Rather they treated the army as a police force to be deployed on the border without questions.

Raising the Indian flag at Haji Pir Pass

Lal Bahadur Shastri, disregarded professional military advice after the 1965 war, to sign a disastrous accord in Tashkent after intense bullying by Soviet leaders, which gave back the hard-won Haji Pir pass in Kashmir and land up to Lahore in the Punjab, to Pakistan. A deal which was protested by many Indian military officers with resignations, including by BJP leader Jaswant Singh.
In more recent times, Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh is reported to have been on the verge of signing a deal which would have seen Indian forces vacating Siachen ! Luckily last minute consultations with the Army and apprehensions voiced by the military leadership, besides continued Pakistani belligerence, placed that proposal on the backburner.

Unlike in the US, India does not use policy inputs from its Generals’ in forming its foreign policy. Generals come into the picture as bit players asked to advise when issues related to the border are almost finalised!

On a more philosophical plane, the Indian state has formulated a policy which rejects the use of force as an instrument of politics in favour of a policy of strategic restraint that minimizes the importance of the military.

This is said to spring from Gandhian principles. But in reality stems perhaps from a strong lack of trust of the country’s military among its elected leadership. This anti-militarism despite the reality of conflict and war that followed independence, has effectively tied India’s hands in dealing with states like Pakistan, whose state policy lies in forcing India to part with territory through overt or covert use of its military-intelligence infrastructure.

As a result, India blindly searches for a way to manage Pakistan’s provocations, every time it is hit in the face by it. Whether it be a Kargil, a terror strike in Mumbai, bombings of marketplaces and mosques or nuclear blackmail at every stage.

Similarly, devoid of proper coordination in formulating foreign policy and military planning, India does not know how to proceed when Chinese forces test India with a Sumdrongchu or threaten Indian ships in the South China Sea.
 

Without game theorising involving all essential arms of the government, including the Armed Forces, India can never realise which move by its opponents is a bluff, which a blind, which a real threat. When Chinese forces supposedly threatened India in Arunachal Pradesh in the late 1980s, Pakistan’s bomb was ticking away towards fruition. Were we fooled into a defensive stand, so that Pakistan gained valuable time to complete its Nuclear Bomb, without risking a raid by Indian fighter jets?

19th Century Cartoon on China-phobia

As strategic thinker Stephen Cohen once remarked in an essay “Indian leaders simply have not seen the use of force as a useful instrument of politics”, simply because they did not trust the use of force or those they would have to employ in the effort.

 

However, it is time our leadership gave heed to what Gen Chaudhuri is reported to have told Chavan when quizzed about the possibility of a military coup: (a) there was a deep-seated respect for constitutional government at all levels in the country. (b) The size of India and the degree of decentralisation of its government machinery made it impracticable for the Army to seize power from both the Union and the State governments in a single operation. (c) If the Army were to attempt a coup against the Union government without seizing power in the States simultaneously, the political machinery would remain operational and the coup would almost certainly be ineffectual. (d) Any coup attempt would place a critical strain on the loyalty of Army, since State loyalties and rivalries are a real factor in the Army.

Rather they would do well to understand that in the modern world as in the ancient, power and projection of power are ways to define and shape foreign policy. It was not for nothing, that Theodore Roosevelt, who was US President at beginning of the 20^th century formulated America’s foreign policy stance till the Second World War – “Walk softly, but carry a big stick.”